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Abstract—We study the influence of clustering, more specifically triangles, on cascading failures in interdependent networks or
systems, in which we model the dependence between comprising systems using a dependence graph. First, we propose a new model
that captures how the presence of triangles in the dependence graph alters the manner in which failures transmit from affected
systems to others. Unlike existing models, the new model allows us to approximate the failure propagation dynamics using a multi-type
branching process, even with triangles. Second, making use of the model, we provide a simple condition that indicates how increasing
clustering will affect the likelihood that a random failure triggers a cascade of failures, which we call the probability of cascading failures
(PoCF). In particular, our condition reveals an intriguing observation that the influence of clustering on PoCF depends on the
vulnerability of comprising systems to an increasing number of failed neighboring systems and the current PoCF, starting with different
types of failed systems. Our numerical studies hint that increasing clustering impedes cascading failures under both (truncated) power
law and Poisson degree distributions. Furthermore, our finding suggests that, as the degree distribution becomes more concentrated
around the mean degree with smaller variance, increasing clustering will have greater impact on the PoCF. A numerical investigation of
networks with Poisson and power law degree distributions reflects this finding and demonstrates that increasing clustering reduces the
PoCF much faster under Poisson degree distributions in comparison to power law degree distributions.
Index Terms—Cascading failures, clustering, interdependent systems, transitivity.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Many modern systems that provide critical services we
rely on consist of interdependent systems. Examples
include modern information and communication net-
works/systems, power systems, manufacturing systems,
and transportation systems, among others. In order to de-
liver their services, the comprising or component systems
(CSes) must work together and oftentimes support each
other.
Growing interdependence among CSes also exposes a
source of vulnerability: the failure of one CS can spread to
other CSes via dependence because a CS may no longer
be able to function without the support from failed CS(es).
From this viewpoint, it is obvious that the overall robustness
of the system to failures will depend on the underlying
dependence structure among CSes. We adopt a dependence
graph to capture such interdependence among CSes, which
we assume is neutral, i.e., there are no degree correlations
between neighbors.
Despite a growing interest in modeling and understand-
ing the robustness of large, complex systems (e.g., [1], [2],
[7], [26], [38], [41], [42], [43], [47]), intricate interdependence
among CSes makes their analysis challenging. Furthermore,
to the best of our knowledge, there is no extensive theory or
design guidelines that allow us to answer even seemingly
basic questions.
Many of earlier studies that investigated the cascading
behavior of failures in interdependent networks or sys-
tems, including our own, assumed tree-like propagation
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of failures (e.g., [27], [28], [29], [44], [46]). But, it is well
documented that many real networks exhibit much higher
clustering, more formally known as transitivity, than clas-
sical random graphs (e.g., Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs or
configuration models [5], [34]). Although how clustering is
introduced in different real networks is still an open ques-
tion, this observation led to new models that can generate
clustered random graphs, e.g., [23], [32], [36].
Of particular concern is a widespread outbreak of fail-
ures among CSes, which can compromise the function of
the overall system, thereby risking a potentially catastrophic
system-level failure. We refer to a cascade of failures or cas-
cading failures as an event in which the system experiences
widespread failures well beyond the local neighborhood
around the initial failure and, in the absence of remedial
actions, the spread of failures slows down only when newly
failed CSes no longer have other CSes they can cause to fail.
A key question we are interested in is: how does clustering
observed in real networks change the likelihood that a random
failure of a CS leads to a cascade of failures in a large system?
The goal of our study is two-fold: (i) to propose a new
model that will allow researchers to borrow existing tools in
order to study the effects of clustering or transitivity, and (ii)
to complement existing studies (summarized in Section 2)
and contribute to the emerging theory on complex systems,
by examining the impact of clustering on the robustness of
the systems with respect to random failures of CSes. Our
hope is that the new findings and insight reported here
will help engineers and researchers better understand the
influence of critical system properties, including clustering,
and incorporate them into design guidelines of complex
systems.
In order to answer the aforementioned question of in-
terest to us, we develop a new model for capturing the
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2influence of clustering on the likelihood of a random failure
triggering cascading failures in large systems comprising
many CSes. More precisely, it models the effect of triangles
in a dependence graph on transmission of failures from
affected CSes to their neighbors, as did the authors of [19],
[32], but in a very different fashion.
Our model differs from existing models employed to
study similar effects: they account for the influence of tri-
angles (or other short cycles) either by modifying degree
distributions to model the joint distributions of independent
edge degrees and triangle degrees [19], [32], [47] or by
replicating nodes to create cliques of size equal to their
degrees [15], [16]. Instead, our model identifies the scenarios
where a triangle among three CSes in the dependence graph
alters the manner in which failures propagate locally. In
so doing, it allows us to capture the dynamics of failure
propagation with the presence of triangles.
A key benefit of our model is that it allows us to leverage
an extensive set of tools available for branching processes: as
pointed out in [32], it was believed that the presence of short
cycles due to high clustering renders the theory of (multi-
type) branching processes inapplicable. However, we will
demonstrate that, by keeping track of what we call immediate
parents and children, we can approximate failure propa-
gation using a multi-type branching process. As a result,
we are able to use existing tools to estimate the likelihood
of experiencing cascading failures in large systems. This in
turn allows us to derive a simple, yet intuitive condition
(Theorem 1) that tells us how increasing clustering would
change the likelihood of experiencing cascading failures.
Our findings, to some extent, corroborate earlier findings
obtained using different models. Moreover, our main result
(Theorem 1) reveals interesting insight that sheds new light
on the complicated relation between system parameters and
the influence of clustering.
Although our study is carried out in the framework of
propagating failures in interdependent systems, we suspect
that the basic model and approach as well as key findings
are applicable to other applications with suitable changes.
These applications include (i) information or rumor propa-
gation or new technology adoption via social networks, (ii)
an epidemic of disease in a society (e.g., cities or countries),
and (iii) spread of malware in the Internet.
1.1 A summary of main contributions
The main contributions of our study can be summarized as
follows.
F1. We propose a new model that captures the influence
of triangles in dependence graphs on failure spreading
dynamics. Unlike existing models (e.g., [15], [16], [32], [36]),
we explicitly model the manner in which a triangle alters
how failure transmits between CSes. Therefore, it enables
us to study the effect of clustering in dependence graphs on
failure propagation dynamics and the vulnerability of the
system to cascading failures, which we measure using the
probability of cascading failures (PoCF).
As mentioned earlier, the model allows us to borrow a
rich set of existing tools by approximating failure propaga-
tions using a multi-type branching process [20]. Moreover, it
separates the influence of clustering on PoCFs from that of
degree correlations, which is a problem observed with some
existing models [19], [32].
F2. Our main finding (Theorem 1) illustrates that the influ-
ence of clustering on PoCF is rather complicated in that it
depends on the ratio of PoCFs and infection probabilities
of different types of CSes, which will be defined precisely
in Section 4. However, there exists a simple condition that
tells us whether higher clustering facilitates or impedes
cascading failures.
F3. Numerical studies reveal that increasing clustering tends
to impede cascades of failures, rendering the system more
robust to random failures. In addition, clustering has greater
influence on PoCFs when the degree distribution in the
dependence graph is more concentrated around the mean
with smaller variance. In particular, our study indicates that
the PoCF decreases more rapidly with increasing clustering
under Poisson degree distributions in comparison to power
law degree distributions. We offer an intuitive explanation
for this observation on the basis of our model and main
finding (Theorem 1).
A few words on notation: throughout the paper, we
will use boldface letters or symbols to denote (row) vectors
or vector functions.1 For instance, d denotes a vector, and
the j-th element of d is denoted by dj . Vector 1 repre-
sents the vector of ones of an appropriate dimension. The
set Z+ (resp. IN) denotes the set of nonnegative integers
{0, 1, 2, . . .} (resp. positive integers {1, 2, 3, . . .}). Finally, all
vector inequalities are assumed componentwise.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
summarizes existing studies that are most closely related
to our study. Section 3 delineates the dependence graphs
and infection graphs we use to model the propagation of
failures throughout the system, followed by a more detailed
description of the transmission of failures among CSes and
the influence of triangles in Section 4. Section 5 outlines the
multi-type branching process we employ to approximate
failure propagations and PoCFs in large systems. Sections 6
and 7 present our main analytical finding and numerical
studies, respectively. We provide the proof of the main
finding in Section 8 and then conclude in Section 9.
2 RELATED LITERATURE
There is already extensive literature on the topic of epi-
demics, information propagation and cascading failures
(e.g., [1], [3], [4], [7], [34], [44]), which cuts across mul-
tiple disciplines (e.g., epidemiology [11], [18], [37], [39],
finance [8], [9], social networks [22], [33], and technolog-
ical networks [12], [13], [27]). Given the large volume of
literature, it would be an unwise exercise to attempt to
provide a summary of all related studies. Furthermore,
although the topic of clustering has seen a renewed interest
recently, especially in the context of social networks and
technological networks and its role in failure spreading, it
has been studied in the past in different settings, including
population biology and epidemiology [17], [25]. For these
reasons, here we only summarize the most relevant studies
that deal with the effects of clustering on cascading behavior
in networks. To improve readability, even though there are
1. All vectors are assumed to be row vectors.
3some differences in the employed models, we use the term
‘cascade’ synonymously with ‘epidemic’ and ‘contagion’ in
the remainder of this section because the studied events or
phenomena are similar.
As stated in Section 1, earlier (classical) random graph
models proved to be unsuitable for describing many real
networks; as the network sizes increase, they typically lead
to tree-like structures and fail to reproduce some salient
features of real networks, including the presence of short
cycles which leads to higher clustering. In order to address
the shortcomings of the random graph models, Miller [32]
and Newman [36] independently proposed a new random
graph model by extending the classical configuration model,
which can produce clustered networks with tunable param-
eters: unlike in the classical configuration model where only
a degree sequence or probability is specified, the new model
specifies the joint probability pst(ks, kt) of two degrees –
independent edge degree ks and triangle degree kt; an
independent edge of a node is an edge with a neighbor
which is not a part of a triangle. Since a triangle has two
incident edges on the node, the total degree of a node with
degrees (ks, kt) is ks + 2× kt.
Utilizing this new random graph model, Miller [32]
investigated the impact of clustering with respect to both
cascade size and threshold. His study shows that, although
clustered networks could exhibit a smaller cascade thresh-
old, compared to a configuration model with an identical
degree distribution, this is caused by the degree correla-
tions, also known as assortativity or assortative mixing,
introduced in the process of generating clustered networks.
When networks with similar degree correlations are com-
pared, clustering raises the cascade threshold and dimin-
ishes the cascade size.
In another study using the same model, Hackett et.
al [19] examined the influence of clustering on the expected
cascade size in both site and bond percolation as well as the
Watts’ random threshold model in z-regular graphs. They
showed that clustering reduces the cascade size in the case
of bond and site percolation. For the Watts’ model in the
z-regular graphs, their finding suggests that the impact of
clustering depends on the value of z.
In another line of interesting studies, Coupechoux and
Lelarge proposed a new random graph model where some
nodes are replaced by cliques of size equal to their de-
grees [15], [16]. Making use of this new model, they ex-
amined the influence of clustering in social networks on
diffusion and contagion in (random) networks. Their key
findings include the observation that, in the contagion
model with symmetric thresholds, the effects of clustering
on cascade threshold depend on the mean node degree; for
small mean degrees, clustering impedes cascades, whereas
for large mean degrees, cascades are facilitated by cluster-
ing.
Although their contagion model is similar to our model,
there is a key difference; while replicating the nodes to
generate cliques in the random graphs, their model assumes
that the contagion thresholds of all cloned nodes in a clique
are identical. In our model, however, the nodes forming tri-
angles can have different thresholds, which we feel is more
realistic in many cases. As we will show, this seemingly
innocuous difference has a significant impact on the effects
of clustering on cascading behavior.
In [47], Zhuang and Yag˘an extended the model of
Miller [32] and Newman [36] to study information propaga-
tion in a multiplex network with two layers representing an
online social network (OSN) and a physical network, both of
which have high clustering. Only a subset of vertices in the
physical network are assumed to be active in the OSN. Their
key findings are: (a) clustering consistently impedes cas-
cades of information to a large number of nodes with respect
to both the critical threshold of information cascade and the
mean size of cascades; and (b) information transmissibility
(i.e., average probability of information transmission over a
link) has significant impact; when the transmissibility is low,
it is easier to trigger a cascade of information propagation
with a smaller, densely connected OSN than with a large,
loosely connected OSN. However, when the transmissibility
is high, the opposite is true.
In another study closely related to [47], Zhuang et. al
[48] investigated the impact of the presence of triangles on
cascading behavior in multiplex networks, using a content-
dependent linear threshold model. Their numerical studies
show that the impact of increasing clustering depends on
the mean degrees; when the mean degrees are small, increas-
ing clustering makes cascades less likely. However, beyond
some threshold on the mean degrees, it has the opposite
effect.
There are several major differences between these stud-
ies and ours. For instance, unlike these existing studies that
primarily focused on (expected) cascade size or threshold,
we focus on the likelihood that a random failure in the
system will cause a cascade of failures in the system. More-
over, our model and main finding (Theorem 1) together offer
some key insights that are hard to obtain using the previous
models and shed some light on how the degree distributions
change the effects of clustering.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
Let V be the set of CSes. We model the interdependence
among CSes using an undirected dependence graph G =
(V, E): the vertex set V consists of the CSes, and undirected
edges in E between vertices indicate mutual dependence
relations between the end vertices.2 Two CSes with an
undirected edge between them are said to be (dependence)
neighbors.
An undirected edge e ∈ E in the dependence graph
should be interpreted as a pair of directed edges pointing
in the opposite directions. A directed edge from a CS to
another CS means that the latter can fail as a result of the
failure of the former. In this sense, we say that the first CS
supports the latter CS. When we need to refer to directed
edges in the dependence graph, we shall call it the directed
dependence graph (in order to distinguish it from the undi-
rected dependence graph or, simply, the dependence graph).
For notational convenience, we often denote a generic
CS in the system by a or a′ throughout the paper.
2. These dependence relations are not necessarily the physical links
in a network. For example, in a power system, an overload failure
in one part of power grid can cause a failure in another part that is
not geographically close or without direct physical connection to the
former.
43.1 Degree distributions and clustering coefficient
We denote the degree distribution (or probability mass
function) of the dependence graph by p0 := (p0(d); d ∈ IN),
where p0(d) is the fraction of CSes with d neighbors. Thus,
we assume that when we select a CS randomly, its degree
can be modeled using a random variable (RV) with distri-
bution p0.
In our study, we are interested in modeling the effects of
clustering in the dependence graph on the robustness of the
system. We adopt the clustering coefficient in order to mea-
sure the level of clustering in the dependence graph [35]:
define a connected triple to be a vertex with edges to two
other neighboring vertices. Then, the clustering coefficient
is given by
C :=
3 × # of triangles in the graph
# of connected triples in the graph
. (1)
In other words, the clustering coefficient tells us the fraction
of connected triples that have an edge between the neigh-
bors. It is clear that this coefficient will be strictly positive
if there exists at least one triangle in the graph. Throughout
the study, we denote the clustering coefficient by C ∈ (0, 1).
As shown in [35], the clustering coefficient of real net-
works can be much larger than that of random graphs.
However, for most real networks, it does not exceed 0.2.
In particular, all information and technological networks,
which are the networks of primary interest to us, have a
clustering coefficient less than or equal to 0.13. For this rea-
son, we focus on scenarios where the clustering coefficient
is not large but not negligible.
3.2 Propagation of failures
To study the robustness of a system to failures, we need
to model how a failure spreads from one CS to another.
Here, we describe the model we employ to approximate the
dynamics of failure propagation between CSes.
We model failure propagation with the help of a function
℘f : IN
2 → [0, 1]: for fixed d ∈ IN and 1 ≤ nf ≤ d, ℘f (d, nf )
tells us the probability that a CS with a degree d will fail
as well after nf of its d neighbors fail.3 Although it is not
necessary, throughout the paper, we assume ℘f (d, d) = 1
for all d ∈ IN, i.e., a CS fails when all of its supporting
neighbors fail, because it will be isolated from the rest of the
system.
An example that fits this model is the random threshold
model used by Watts in [44], which is also used in other
studies (e.g., [3], [6]). In the Watts’ model, every CS a in V
has an intrinsic value ξa. These values {ξa; a ∈ V} of CSes
are modeled using mutually independent, continuous RVs
with a common distribution F . We refer to ξa as the security
state of CS a.
In his model, a CS a fails as a consequence of the
failures of its neighbors when the fraction of its failed
neighbors exceeds its security state ξa. Therefore, for a
given pair (d, nf ) with nf ≤ d, ℘f (d, nf ) is equal to
P [ξa < nf/d] = F (nf/d).
3. This function was called the influence response function in [19],
[45].
3.3 Infection graphs with triangles
For our study, we focus on scenarios where each failed CS,
on the average, affects only a small number of neighbors.4
Furthermore, we are primarily interested in scenarios in
which, even when cascading failures occur, the fraction of
affected CSes is relatively small. To make this more precise,
we introduce infection graphs: starting with an initial failure
of a CS in the system, the infection graph consists of all
failed CSes and the directed edges used to contribute to the
failures of neighbors. In other words, a directed edge from
CS a to CS a′ in the directed dependence graph belongs to
the infection graph if and only if CS a fails before CS a′ does.
If we replace the directed edges in the infection graph with
undirected edges, we call it the undirected infection graph.
Unlike many earlier studies that assumed a tree-like
infection graph with no cycles, e.g., [6], [27], [29], [44], [46],
we allow for the existence of triangles in the undirected
infection graph. But, we assume that the triangles are not
very common in the infection graph because the fraction
of affected CSes is small. For the same reason, we do not
consider other larger cliques consisting of more than three
CSes in the infection graph, for such larger cliques would
appear much less frequently [24].
4 AGENT TYPES AND NEIGHBOR INFECTION
PROBABILITIES
As mentioned in Section 1, we are interested in scenarios
where the number of CSes in the system is large (at least in
the order of thousands). As we will explain shortly, in a large
system, the propagation of failures can be approximated
with the help of a multi-type branching process under
some simplifying assumptions. To be more precise, we shall
borrow from the theory of branching processes with finitely
many types in order to study the likelihood of a single initial
failure leading to cascading failures.
4.1 Agent types
In our model, depending on how a CS fails, there are three
possible types we consider for the failed CS. More precisely,
a CS that experiences a random failure without any failed
neighbor is of type 0. For each t ∈ {1, 2} =: T , a failed
CS is of type t if its failure was caused by those of t failed
neighbors. The CS(es) whose failures lead to the failure of
another CS, say a, are called the parent(s) of a, and CS a
is called their child. Also, borrowing from the language of
epidemiology, we say that the parent(s) infected the child.
Obviously, we implicitly assume that every failed CS has
no more than two parents. In general, it is possible that some
high degree CSes experience a failure after more than two
of their neighbors fail. But, this would be uncommon when
the fraction of failed CSes is small, which is the scenario we
focus on in this study.
We shall discuss the distribution of the number of chil-
dren of two different types which are infected by a failed
4. When each failed CS causes many other neighbors to fail as
well, cascading failures are likely and should happen often. This may
indicate that the system is poorly designed. Instead, we are interested
in more realistic scenarios of interest in which cascading failures are
possible and do occur, but not too frequently.
5CS of type t ∈ {0, 1, 2} shortly. To explain these children
(vector) distributions, we first need to describe how we
approximate the probability with which a neighbor of failed
CS(es) becomes infected.
4.2 Triangles in infection graphs
In order to motivate the model we employ to approximate
the propagation of failures, we begin with an illustrating
example shown in Fig. 1. In the figure, dotted lines indi-
cate undirected edges in the dependence graph, and solid
directed arrows represent the contribution to the failures of
children by failed CSes, i.e., parents.
1 
2 4 
3 
1 
2 4 
3 
- uninfected CS
- infected CS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
IP of CS 4
IC of 
CS 1 IC of 
CS 4
IP of 
CS 3
IP = immediate parent 
IC = immediate child
Fig. 1. Example of type 1 and 2 CSes.
Initially, CS 1 is the lone failed CS and, as a result, CSes 2
through 4 face the possibility of infection by CS 1. Suppose
that CS 4 becomes infected while CSes 2 and 3 remain
unaffected. Since CS 4 has a single parent, namely CS 1,
it is an example of type 1 CS. In this case, we call CS 4 an
immediate child of CS 1, and refer to CS 1 as the immediate
parent of CS 4.
On the other hand, even though CS 3 first survives
the failure of CS 1, once CS 4 fails following its infection
by CS 1, the failures of CSes 1 and 4, both of which are
neighbors of CS 3, lead to that of CS 3. In this case, because
it takes the failures of two neighbors to cause that of CS 3,
it is an example of type 2 CS. We call CS 1 and CS 4 the
first parent and the immediate parent, respectively, of CS 3.
Analogously, we call CS 3 an immediate child of CS 4 (but
not of CS 1). It will be clear why we call CS 1 and CS 4 the
immediate parent of CS 4 and CS 3, respectively, when we
describe the multi-type branching process to approximate
failure propagation in Section 5.
Before we proceed, in order to explain the role of tri-
angles in failure propagation dynamics, we first describe
several scenarios where the presence of triangles in the
dependence graph does not affect the failure propagation
dynamics. This will help us to isolate the cases of interest to
us, in which the existence of triangles alters the way failures
propagate.
Sc1. In the example shown in Fig. 1, we assumed that CS
1 is a parent of CS 4. Suppose instead that CSes 1 and 4 are
not neighbors, but there are additional failed CS(es) between
them forming a path from CS 1 to CS 4 in the infection
graph. In this case, since CSes 1 and 4 are not neighbors,
CSes 1, 3 and 4 do not form a triangle. Thus, whether or
not we model triangles in the dependence graph would not
affect the transmission of failure to CS 3.
Sc2. Even though in Fig. 1 we assumed that CS 4 was
infected by CS 1 alone, it is also possible that CS 4 has
additional parent(s) that contributed to its failure. From
the viewpoint of modeling the influence of the triangle
(amongst CSes 1, 3, and 4) on potential infection of CS 3 by
CSes 1 and 4, however, whether or not CS 4 has additional
parent(s) is unimportant.
Sc3. According to the way we defined our infection
graphs, three failed CSes that form a triangle in the de-
pendence graph may not form a triangle in the undirected
infection graph. The reason for this is that, when two neigh-
boring CSes fail nearly simultaneously in such a way that
the failure of one does not contribute to that of the other,
there is no edge in the infection graph. Roughly speaking,
there are two different ways in which this can happen.
C1. One CS fails first and infects the other two neighbors
that fail almost simultaneously, so that the latter two
do not contribute to the failure of each other.
C2. Two of the CSes first fail nearly at the same time in
a way that the failure of one does not contribute to
that of the other. These two failed CSes then cause
the third CS to fail.
In case C1, the existence of the triangle in the dependence
graph among the three CSes does not play any role in the
propagation of failures and the infection of the latter two
CSes would behave the same way even if they were not
neighbors with each other. Similarly, in case C2, the exis-
tence of a triangle, more specifically that of an edge between
the first two failing CSes, is irrelevant to the infection of the
third CS.
These observations suggest that, from the viewpoint of
modeling the effects of triangles in failure propagation, the
only case in which the presence of a triangle among three
CSes matters for transmitting failures is when the three
CSes fail one after another and each failed CS contributes
to ensuing failures of other CS(es). In other words, the first
CS to fail contributes to the failure of the second CS in the
triangle, and the failures of the first two CSes subsequently
cause that of the third CS. This is precisely what our model
captures as explained in the subsequent section.
Recall from scenario Sc1 that two failed neighbors of
an uninfected CS might not be neighbors with each other.
Therefore, in general the parents of a type 2 CS need not
be neighbors. When this is true, however, the three CSes
do not form a triangle and whether or not we model
triangles would not have any significant impact on our
study. Furthermore, if only a small fraction of CSes become
infected as we assumed earlier, for most CSes with small
to moderate degrees, the likelihood that they will have two
or more failed neighbors that are not neighbors with each
other would be small. For these reasons, we do not consider
or model the scenarios where the two parents of a type 2
CS are not neighbors. Put differently, we only model type 2
CSes whose parents are neighbors and the three CSes form
a triangle as illustrated in Fig. 1, in order to examine the
effects of triangles in the dependence graph.
However, it should be evident that our model can be
extended to consider other features, including larger cycles,
by introducing additional types of CSes necessary to cap-
ture their presence. Obviously, this is likely to increase its
complexity and degrade its tractability.
64.3 Infection probability of neighbors
For t ∈ T , we denote by qt the probability that a CS
(without knowing its degree) will fail following the t-th
failure among the neighbors and become a type t CS. We
shall refer to qt as the infection probability of type t CS. Keep
in mind that these infection probabilities qt, t ∈ T , do not
depend on clustering coefficient as we explain below.
• Computation of q1: The infection probability q1 is the
probability with which CS 4 (or CS 2 or 3) is infected by
CS 1 as the sole failed neighbor in Fig. 1 without knowing
the degree of CS 4. According to the model outlined in
Section 3.2, a CS of degree d with only a single failed
neighbor will fail with probability ℘f (d, 1). Therefore, by
conditioning on the degree of the neighbor, we can obtain
the infection probability q1 as
q1 :=
∑
d∈IN
w1(d) ℘f (d, 1), (2)
where
w1(d) :=
d · p0(d)
davg
for all d ∈ IN, (3)
and davg :=
∑
d∈IN d · p0(d) is the average degree of CSes.
The reason that the degree distribution of a neighbor
used in (2) is given by w1 := (w1(d); d ∈ IN), as opposed to
p0, was first discussed in [10]: the degree distribution of the
neighbor is the conditional degree distribution given that it
is a neighbor of the failed CS attempting to infect it. The
probability that a neighbor of the failed CS has degree d is
proportional to d and, hence, is approximately w1(d) under
the assumption that the dependence graph is neutral.
• Computation of q2: The infection probability q2 can
be computed in an analogous manner. Since q2 is the prob-
ability that a CS fails following the second failure among
neighbors and we assume that the two failed neighbors form
a triangle with the CS (from the previous subsection), this
is the probability with which CS 3 fails in the example of
Fig. 1, following the failure of CS 4 after having survived the
failure of CS 1 (without knowing the degree of CS 3). First,
since the CS has two failed neighbors, clearly its degree is at
least two. Second, it must have survived the first failure of
a neighbor before succumbing to the second failure among
neighbors.
Because the degree of such a CS cannot be one, the condi-
tional degree distribution is given byw2 := (w2(d); d ∈ IN),
where
w2(1) = 0 and w2(d) =
w1(d)
1− w1(1) for d ∈ IN \ {1}. (4)
Taking these observations into account and conditioning on
the degree of CS, we obtain
q2 :=
∑
d∈IN
w2(d)(1− ℘f (d, 1))℘˜f (d, 2), (5)
where ℘˜f (d, 2) is the probability that a CS of degree d will
fail after the second failure among neighbors, conditional
on that it survived the first failure of a neighbor. Using the
definition of the conditional probability, we get
℘˜f (d, 2) :=
℘f (d, 2)− ℘f (d, 1)
1− ℘f (d, 1) , d ∈ IN \ {1}. (6)
Substituting (4) and (6) in (5), we get
q2 =
1
1− w1(1)
∞∑
d=2
w1(d)
(
℘f (d, 2)− ℘f (d, 1)
)
. (7)
Let us explain the conditional probability ℘˜f (d, 2) given
in (6) using the Watts’ model. As explained earlier, a CS fails
when the fraction of failed neighbors exceeds its security
state ξ and ℘f (d, nf ) = F (nf/d). Therefore, given that a
CS of degree d survived the failure of a single neighbor,
the conditional probability that it will fail when a second
neighbor fails is equal to
℘˜f (d, 2) = P
[
ξ <
2
d
∣∣∣ ξ ≥ 1
d
]
=
P
[
1
d ≤ ξ < 2d
]
P
[
1
d ≤ ξ
]
=
℘f (d, 2)− ℘f (d, 1)
1− ℘f (d, 1) .
From the degree distributions defined in (3) and (4) and
used to compute the infection probabilities in (2) and (5),
respectively, it is clear that our model implicitly assumes a
neutral dependence graph and does not model any potential
degree correlations between CSes. It has been observed (e.g.,
[19], [32]) that one of challenges to studying the effects
of clustering is that, many existing models for generating
clustered networks unintentionally introduce degree corre-
lations or assortativity. From the construction of cliques via
replication of nodes with identical degrees, it is obvious
that similar degree correlations are introduced in the model
proposed in [15], [16].
In [32], Miller points out that the influence of such degree
correlations caused some researchers to incorrectly conclude
that clustering facilitates cascades of failures with respect
to cascade sizes and cascade threshold; he demonstrates
that, when compared against unclustered networks with
similar degree correlations, clustered networks have smaller
cascade sizes and higher cascade threshold. In other words,
clustering has the opposite effects and impedes cascades of
failures.
Our model does away with this problem by model-
ing the influence of clustering on transmission of failures,
rather than trying to generate random graphs (of finite size)
explicitly. For this reason, any qualitative changes in the
robustness of systems we identify using the model can be
attributed to clustering, without having to worry about the
influence of degree correlations.
5 MULTI-TYPE BRANCHING PROCESS FOR MOD-
ELING THE SPREAD OF FAILURES
We approximate the propagation of failures among CSes
using a multi-type branching process (MTBP), in which
the members of the MTBP are of the types defined in the
previous section. We estimate the PoCF of a large system,
using the probability that the population in the MTBP does
not die out.
This approach is consistent with our notion of cascading
failures provided in Section 1: when cascading failures occur
in a large system, they will likely spread to different parts
of the system well beyond the local neighborhood near the
initial random failure and slow down only when newly
failed CSes do not have neighbors to infect any more. Thus,
7in the case of an infinite network where the number of CSes
in the system is unbounded (as assumed in many studies,
e.g., [19], [29], [32], [48]), the spread of failures will not cease
when cascading failures happen, which is equivalent to the
population not dying out in our MTBP.
We assume that initially a randomly chosen CS experi-
ences a failure. Since this CS does not have any parent, it is
of type 0. Subsequently, when a type t CS fails, it produces
immediate children of two different types in accordance
with the (immediate) children distribution ht described
below, independently of other infected CSes in the system.
5.1 Multi-type branching processes
The MTBP we use to approximate failure propagation can
be constructed as follows: it starts with a single type 0 agent
at the beginning (the zero-th generation). Then, each mem-
ber in the k-th generation (k ∈ Z+) produces immediate
children of two different types, who become members of
the (k+1)-th generation, according to children distributions
derived in Section 5.2, independently of each other.
Since an infected CS can have up to two parents and,
when a CS has two parents, one of them is the parent of the
other as shown in Fig. 1, the parents themselves can belong
to two different generations. A failed CS in our infection
graph belongs to the k-th generation in the MTBP if and
only if the length of the longest path in the infection graph
from the root to the CS is equal to k.
7
in the case of an infinite network where the number of CSes
in the system is unbounded (as assumed in many studies,
e.g., [19], [29], [32], [48]), the spread of failures will not cease
when cascading failures happen, which is equivalent to the
population not dying out in our MTBP.
We assume that initially a randomly chosen CS experi-
ences a failure. Since this CS does not have any parent, it is
of type 0. Subsequently, when a type t CS fails, it produces
immediate children of two different types in accordance
with the (immediate) children distribution ht described
below, independently of other infected CSes in the system.
5.1 Multi-type branching processes
The MTBP we use to approximate failure propagation can
be constructed as follows: it starts with a single type 0 agent
at the beginning (the zero-th generation). Then, each mem-
ber in the k-th generation (k ∈ Z+) produces immediate
children of two different types, who become members of
the (k+1)-th generation, according to children distributions
derived in Section 5.2, independently of each other.
Since an infected CS can have up to two parents and,
when a CS has two parents, one of them is the parent of the
other as shown in Fig. 1, the parents the selves can belong
to t o different generations. failed CS in our infection
graph belongs to the k-th generation in the TBP if and
only if the length of the longest path in the infection graph
fro the r t t t e S is e al t .
1 
4 
3 
Infection Graph 
(a)
1 
4 
3 
0th generation 
1st generation 
2nd generation 
Multi-type Branching Process 
(b)
Fig. 2. (a) Infection graph, (b) corresponding Multi-type branching pro-
cess.
Let us illustrate this using the example in Fig. 1 with CS 1
as the root of an infection graph, which experiences the first
failure. The resulting infection graph is shown in Fig. 2(a),
where unnumbered circles are other infected children that
are not shown in Fig. 1. In the figure, a solid blue arrow
indicates the influence of the immediate parent that causes
the child to fail, whereas a dotted red arrow represents the
influence of the first parent of a type 2 CS which contributes
to the failure.
In order to construct the corresponding MTBP, we only
keep the solid blue arrows and delete the dotted red arrows
from the infection graph. In other words, we only retain the
arrows from immediate parents. Since every CS has a single
(immediate) parent in the new graph, it is clear that this
gives rise to a directed tree. This is shown in Fig. 2(b). A
failed CS is now a member of the k-th generation in MTBP
if its distance from the root in this new tree is k.
5.2 Immediate children distributions in MTBPs
In order to complete the description of the MTBP that
we employ to approximate failure propagation, we need
to specify the children distribution for each type. Clearly,
except for the initial CS that experiences a random failure,
which is the root of the infection graph, all other infected
CSes are of type 1 or 2, because they must have a parent.
Thus, all children infected by a failed CS would be of either
type 1 or 2.
• Neighbors of a type 0 CS: Assume that CS a expe-
riences the initial random failure. Since CS a is the only
failed CS at the moment, all of its neighbors face the risk of
infection from a single neighbor. Thus, each neighbor will
be infected by CS a and become its immediate child with
probability q1 =: vC0,1 or remain unaffected with probability
1− q1 =: vC0,0.
Because of the presence of triangles in the dependence
graph, it is possible that some of immediate children of CS
a are also neighbors of other unaffected neighbors of CS a.
Suppose that one of these unaffected neighbors of CS a fails
as a result of the failure of a second neighbor, say CS a′,
which was infected by CS a. Then, it will be an immediate
child of CS a′ and will not count as an immediate child of
CS a, as explained in Section 4.2.
• Neighbors of a type 1 CS: Suppose that a CS a is
infected by a single parent a′ and, hence, is of type 1. Recall
from the definition in (1) that the clustering coefficient is the
likelihood that there is an edge between the two neighbors
of a connected triple. Thus, when the clustering coefficient
is C ∈ (0, 1), the probability that there is an edge between
a randomly chosen neighbor of a and its parent a′ can be
approximated using C because CS a is a connected triple.
Moreover, we assume that each neighbor of a has an edge
with the parent a′ with probability C , independently of each
other, which is reasonable for large systems.
Based on this assumption, we approximate the proba-
bility that a neighbor becomes another type 1 CS using the
product (1−C)q1 =: vC1,1 of (a) the probability that it is not
a neighbor of a′ (1 − C) and (b) that of becoming infected
by the failure of CS a (q1). Similarly, the probability that
the neighbor has an edge with a′ and becomes a type 2
CS is estimated using C · q2 =: vC1,2. Note that, when the
neighbor has an edge with the parent a′, in order for it to
be a type 2 CS, it must have initially survived the failure
of a′ and then fail following the failure of CS a. Hence, the
probability that it will fail following the infection of CS a
and become a type 2 CS would be q2, not q1, as explained in
Section 4.3. Finally, the probability that it remains unaffected
is 1− (1− C)q1 − C · q2 =: vC1,0.
• Neighbors of a type 2 CS: When CS a is of type
2 with two parents, it is possible for a neighbor of CS
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approximated using C because CS a is a connected triple.
Moreover, we assume that each neighbor of a has an edge
with the parent a′ with probability C , independently of each
other, which is reasonable for large systems.
Based on this assumption, we approximate the proba-
bility that a neighbor becomes another type 1 CS using the
product (1−C)q1 =: vC1,1 of (a) the probability that it is not
a neighbor of a′ (1 − C) and (b) that of becoming infected
by the failure of CS a (q1). Similarly, the probability that
the neighbor has an edge with a′ and becomes a type 2
CS is estimated using C · q2 =: vC1,2. Note that, when the
neighbor has an edge with the parent a′, in order for it to
be a type 2 CS, it must have initially survived the failure
of a′ and then fail following the failure of CS a. Hence, the
probability that it will fail following the infection of CS a
and become a type 2 CS would be q2, not q1, as explained in
Section 4.3. Finally, the probability that it remains unaffected
is 1− (1− C)q1 − C · q2 =: vC1,0.
• Neighbors of a type 2 CS: When CS a is of type
2 with two parents, it is possible for a neighbor of CS
8a to have an edge with both of the parents and, thus,
have three failed neighbors. However, when the fraction
of failed CSes is low or the clustering coefficient C is not
large, this would not occur often. Furthermore, modeling
CSes with more than two infected neighbors would require
introducing additional types of CSes. For these reasons, we
do not explicitly model the cases where a CS faces more
than two failed neighbors and approximate them using the
case where the CS has only two failed neighbors instead.
Making use of this argument, we assume that neighbors
of a type 2 CS have an edge with (a) neither parent with
probability (1 − C)2 and (b) one parent with probability
1−(1−C)2 = (2C−C2), independently of each other. Note
that the possibility of being a neighbor with both parents is
folded into the latter scenario of having an edge with only
one parent.
On the basis of this assumption, we estimate the proba-
bility that a neighbor of CS a becomes a type 1 CS using
(1 − C)2q1 =: vC2,1 and that of becoming a type 2 CS
by (2C − C2)q2 =: vC2,2. Finally, the probability that the
neighbor avoids infection is equal to 1− (1−C)2q1− (2C−
C2)q2 =: v
C
2,0. When it is convenient and there is no risk of
confusion, we do not explicitly denote the dependence on
clustering coefficient C and write vt,t′ in place of vCt,t′ .
5.2.1 Conditional degree distributions of failed CSes
Given these probabilities, once we fix the degree d and
type t of a failed CS, we can approximate the distribution
of the number of immediate children of different types,
which are produced by the CS with the help of multinomial
distributions: the probability that it produces o1 type 1
children and o2 type 2 children (with o1 + o2 ≤ d − t) is
given by [
d− t
o1 : o2
]
vo1t,1 v
o2
t,2 v
d−t−o1−o2
t,0 ,
where v0,2 = 0, and[
d− t
o1 : o2
]
:=
(d− t)!
o1!o2!(d− t− o1 − o2)! ,
denotes a multinomial coefficient. Hence, we can estimate
the children distribution by conditioning on the degree of
the CS.
The conditional degree distributions of infected CSes
in general differ from the prior distribution p0. We de-
note the conditional degree distribution of type t CSes by
pt := (pt(d); d ∈ IN), t ∈ T . Making use of the degree
distributions of neighbors defined in (3) and (4) and the
failure probability function ℘f , we can obtain the following
conditional degree distributions of infected CSes:
p1(d) =
w1(d) ℘f (d, 1)
q1
for d ∈ IN,
p2(d) =
w1(d)(℘f (d, 2)− ℘f (d, 1))
(1− w1(1))q2 for d ∈ IN \ {1},
and p2(1) = 0.
5.2.2 Children distributions
Putting all the pieces together, we acquire the following
(immediate) children distributions for different types: fix
clustering coefficient C ∈ (0, 1). The probability that a CS of
type t ∈ {0, 1, 2} will produce immediate children given by
a children vector o = (o1, o2) ∈ Z2+, where oj is the number
of type j immediate children, is given by
ht(o;C)
=
∞∑
τ=o1+o2
(
pt(τ + t)
[
τ
o1 : o2
]
vo1t,1 v
o2
t,2 v
τ−o1−o2
t,0
)
. (8)
5.3 Probability of extinction
Let Nt(k), t ∈ T and k ∈ IN, be the number of type t
CSes in the k-th generation of the MTBP. For instance, in
Fig. 2(b), N1(1) = 3, N2(1) = 0, N1(2) = 2, and N2(2) =
1. The probability P [lim supk→∞ (N1(k) +N2(k)) = 0] is
called the probability of extinction (PoE) [20]. Obviously, the
PoCF is equal to one minus the PoE.
Let µ = (µ1, µ2), where µt is the PoE, starting with
a single type t infected CS (instead of a type 0 CS). The
probability of interest to us is the PoE starting with a single
type 0 CS, which we denote by µ0. This can be computed
from µ1 by conditioning on the degree of the CS, say a,
which experiences the initial random failure. In other words,
µ0 =
∑
d∈IN
p0(d)
(
1− q1(1− µ1)
)d
. (9)
Note that q1(1 − µ1) is the probability that a neighbor of
CS a will be infected and then trigger a cascade of failures.
Thus, (1− q1(1− µ1))d is the probability that none of the d
neighbors gives rise to cascading failures. A key question of
interest to us is how clustering coefficient C affects the PoE
µ0 defined in (9), which is a strictly increasing function of
µ1.
For each t ∈ T , let E [ht] = (E [ht,t′ ] ; t′ ∈ T ) be
a 1 × 2 row vector, whose t′-th element is the expected
number of type t′ immediate children from a type t CS.
Define M = [Mt,t′ ] to be a 2 × 2 matrix, whose t-th row is
E [ht], i.e., Mt,t′ = E [ht,t′ ] for all t, t′ ∈ T . Let ρ(M) denote
the spectral radius of M [21].
It is well known [20] that µ = 1 if (i) ρ(M) < 1 or
(ii) ρ(M) = 1 and there is at least one type for which the
probability that it produces exactly one child is not equal
to one. Similarly, if ρ(M) > 1, then µ < 1 and there is
strictly positive probability that spreading failures continue
forever in an infinite system, suggesting that there could be
a cascade of failures in a large system.
6 MAIN ANALYTICAL RESULT
As stated in Section 1, our goal is to understand how
clustering among CSes in the dependence graph affects the
robustness of the system. As it will be clear, the relation
between the PoCF (or equivalently, PoE) and system param-
eters, including clustering coefficient, is rather complicated.
In particular, our main finding stated in Theorem 1 below
suggests that whether increasing clustering escalates the
PoE or not depends on the infection probabilities q1 and
q2 and the current PoEs µ1 and µ2.
9Theorem 1. Suppose 0 < C1 < C2 < 1 and let µi = (µi1, µ
i
2),
i = 1, 2, be the PoE vector corresponding to clustering
coefficient Ci. Assume that µ1 < 1. Then, µ1 ≤ µ2 if
(1− µ11)q1 ≥ (1− µ12)q2. Analogously, we have µ1 ≥ µ2
if (1− µ11)q1 ≤ (1− µ12)q2.
Proof: A proof is provided in Section 8.
The theorem suggests that the relation between cluster-
ing coefficient and PoCF is far from simple in that it depends
on many factors, including the degree distribution p0 and
the failure probability function ℘f , in a rather subtle fashion.
At the same time, it hints that their effects can be succinctly
summarized by the terms in the condition, namely the
current PoEs µt, t ∈ T , and infection probabilities qt, t ∈ T .
Before we proceed with our discussion, let us first
rewrite the conditions in the theorem in a slightly different
manner:
1− µ11
1− µ12
≥ q2
q1
and
1− µ11
1− µ12
≤ q2
q1
(10)
Remark 1. Recall that 1 − µt is the PoCF starting with a
single type t CS. Thus, (1 − µ1)/(1 − µ2) is the ratio of the
PoCFs starting with two different types of CSes. It is now
clear that the conditions in the theorem compare the ratio
of PoCFs for two different types of CSes to that of infection
probabilities. While one would expect the ratio of infection
probabilities to play a role, to the best of our knowledge, our
result is the first to bring to light (i) the fact that the ratio of
PoCFs, (1 − µ1)/(1 − µ2), plays a similar/important role
and (ii) a condition that tells us when increasing clustering
improves or degrades the robustness of the system.
Remark 2. A key implication of our finding is the follow-
ing: consider two distinct degree distributions with the same
mean, but one degree distribution is more concentrated
(around the mean) with smaller variance than the other. As
the clustering coefficient becomes larger, the fraction of type
2 CSes tends to increase. Because a type 2 CS already has
two failed neighbors compared to a single failed neighbor
of a type 1 CS, when CS degrees are concentrated (around
the mean degree), a type 2 CS has fewer neighbors that it
can potentially infect, thereby producing a smaller number
of children on the average.
A consequence of this is that it leads to higher concen-
tration of failed CSes in a local neighborhood. At the same
time, it hinders spreading failures beyond the local neigh-
borhood of already failed CSes, especially when the mean
degrees are not large. Moreover, as we will demonstrate
in the subsequent section, clustering has more pronounced
impact on PoCFs.
Remark 3. One important fact we should point out is
that Theorem 1 alone does not guarantee the monotonic-
ity of PoE (equivalently, PoCF) with respect to clustering
coefficient. The reason for this is as follows: suppose that
0 < C1 < C2 < C3 < 1 and µi is the PoE vector
corresponding to Ci, i = 1, 2, 3. Then, it is possible to
have 1−µ
1
1
1−µ12 >
q2
q1
while 1−µ
2
1
1−µ22 <
q2
q1
because the PoEs can
change when the clustering coefficient goes up from C1 to
C2. When this happens, Theorem 1 tells us (i) µ1 ≤ µ2 and
µ1 ≤ µ3 from the first inequality and (ii) µ2 ≥ µ3 from the
second inequality. Thus, in principle, we could end up with
µ1 < µ3 < µ2. However, our numerical studies provided
in the subsequent section indicate that the monotonicity of
PoCF may hold in many cases of practical interest.
7 NUMERICAL RESULTS
Our main result in Section 6 tells us that, once we know the
PoEs µt, t ∈ T , and the infection probabilities qt, t ∈ T ,
for a fixed clustering coefficient, we can determine whether
an increasing clustering coefficient will elevate or lower the
resulting PoCF. But, this requires the knowledge of, among
other things, the infection probabilities qt, t ∈ T , which
depend on the degree distribution in the dependence graph
and failure probability function ℘f .
The goal of this section is to provide numerical results
to examine how various parameters in our analysis are
affected by the clustering coefficient as we change the degree
distribution and the failure probability function. To this end,
we vary the clustering coefficient over [0.025, 0.40], under
two commonly studied degree distributions – power law
degree distributions and Poisson degree distributions.
For our study, we consider failure probability functions
of the form ℘f (d, nf ) = (nf/d)α with α ∈ [0.6, 1.0]. When
α is small, even the failure of a single neighbor causes the
failure of a CS with relatively high probability. In this sense,
℘f (d, nf ) is less sensitive to d. On the other hand, for large
α, many neighbors have to fail first before a CS fails as a
result. Throughout the section, we assume that the largest
degree of a CS is 20, which we denote by Dmax, and define
D := {1, 2, . . . , Dmax}.5
7.1 Power law degree distributions
Power law degree distributions assume p0(d) ∝ d−β for
some positive constant β. For many real networks, the
power law exponent β lies between 2 and 4 [1], [30]. In our
study, we considered β ∈ [1.5, 4]. However, for β > 2.5, the
resulting PoCF is very small and, for this reason, we do not
present the numbers here.
Fig. 3 plots the PoCF (i.e., 1 − µ0) and the condition
number as a function of the failure probability function
parameter α and clustering coefficient C for three different
values of power law exponent β – 1.6, 1.85 and 2.1. Here,
the condition number refers to the difference 1−µ11−µ2 −
q2
q1
. The
average degree of CSes under the three values of β is 3.186,
2.548, and 2.089, respectively. As mentioned earlier, while
we examined the scenarios with larger β, the PoCF was too
small to be of much interest in our opinion.
O1. According to Theorem 1, when the condition num-
ber is positive (resp. negative), increasing clustering coeffi-
cient C reduces (resp. elevates) the PoCF. It is clear from
Fig. 3 that, for all three values of β, the condition number
is always positive, and the PoCF decreases with clustering
coefficient C . Hence, the plots corroborate our finding in the
theorem. Furthermore, they suggest that the system is likely
to become more robust against random failures and less
prone to experience a cascade of failures. This observation is
consistent with the findings of [32], [47], which reported that
5. We conducted additional numerical studies with larger values of
Dmax and observed similar qualitative results, which are not reported
here.
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Fig. 3. Plots of PoCFs and condition numbers with power law degree
distributions. (a) β = 2.1, (b) β = 1.85, and (c) β = 1.6.
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clustering has an effect of impeding cascades of diseases or
information.
O2. Fig. 4 shows that the ratio of infection probabilities
(q2/q1) never exceeds one. This is in part a consequence of
the following two observations: (i) a potential type 2 CS (i.e.,
a CS with two failed neighbors) has a larger degree (with
respect to the usual stochastic order) than those facing a
single failed neighbor (w2 vs.w1); and (ii) with the assumed
infection probability function ℘f , it becomes more difficult
to infect CSes with two failed neighbors, which already
survived the first failure of a neighbor, than to infect CSes
facing the risk of infection from a single failed neighbor.
This can be seen from the inequality ℘f (d, 2) − ℘f (d, 1) =
1
dα (2
α − 1) ≤ 1dα because 2α ≤ 2 for α ≤ 1.
O3. It is evident from Fig. 4 that the ratio of infection
probabilities (q2/q1) increases with the parameter α. The
reason for this is that, for the assumed infection probability
function, we have
℘f (d, 2)− ℘f (d, 1)
℘f (d, 1)
=
d−α(2α − 1)
d−α
= 2α − 1
for all d > 1, which increases with α. Thus, from the
definition of q1 and q2 in (2) and (7), respectively, it is
obvious that the ratio q2/q1 will follow the same trend.
7.2 Poisson degree distributions
When CS degrees are Poisson distributed with parameter
λ > 0, p0(d) ∝ λdd! for all d ∈ D. A key difference from
power law distributions is that a Poisson distribution is
more concentrated around its mean value. For our study,
we consider λ ∈ [2.0, 4.5].
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Fig. 5. Plots of PoCFs and condition numbers under Poisson degree
distributions. (a) λ = 2.35, (b) λ = 2.6, (c) λ = 2.85 and (d) λ = 3.5.
Fig. 5 plots the PoCF and the condition number for λ =
2.35, 2.6, 2.85, and 3.5. The corresponding average degrees
are 2.598, 2.809, 3.025, and 3.609, respectively. From the
plots, we can draw the following observations.
O4. Similar to the plots in Fig. 3 under power law degree
distributions, the PoCF tends to decrease with increasing
clustering. This can be also inferred from positive condition
numbers shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 3. Plots of PoCFs and condition numbers with power law degree
distributions. (a) β = 2.1, (b) β = 1.85, and (c) β = 1.6.
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Fig. 3. Plots of PoCFs and condition numbers with power law degree
distributions. (a) β = 2.1, (b) β = 1.85, and (c) β = 1.6.
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clustering has an effect of impeding cascades of diseases or
information.
O2. Fig. 4 shows that the ratio of infection probabilities
(q2/q1) never exceeds one. This is in part a consequence of
the following two observations: (i) a potential type 2 CS (i.e.,
a CS with two failed neighbors) has a larger degree (with
respect to the usual stochastic order) than those facing a
single failed neighbor (w2 vs.w1); and (ii) with the assumed
infection probability function ℘f , it becomes more difficult
to infect CSes with two failed neighbors, which already
survived the first failure of a neighbor, than to infect CSes
facing the risk of infection from a single failed neighbor.
This can be seen from the inequality ℘f (d, 2) − ℘f (d, 1) =
1
dα (2
α − 1) ≤ 1dα because 2α ≤ 2 for α ≤ 1.
O3. It is evident from Fig. 4 that the ratio of infection
probabilities (q2/q1) increases with the parameter α. The
reason for this is that, for the assumed infection probability
function, we have
℘f (d, 2)− ℘f (d, 1)
℘f (d, 1)
=
d−α(2α − 1)
d−α
= 2α − 1
for all d > 1, which increases with α. Thus, from the
definition of q1 and q2 in (2) and (7), respectively, it is
obvious that the ratio q2/q1 will follow the same trend.
7.2 Poisson degree distributions
When CS degrees are Poisson distributed with parameter
λ > 0, p0(d) ∝ λdd! for all d ∈ D. A key difference from
power law distributions is that a Poisson distribution is
more concentrated around its mean value. For our study,
we consider λ ∈ [2.0, 4.5].
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Fig. 5. Plots of PoCFs and condition numbers under Poisson degree
distributions. (a) λ = 2.35, (b) λ = 2.6, (c) λ = 2.85 and (d) λ = 3.5.
Fig. 5 plots the PoCF and the condition number for λ =
2.35, 2.6, 2.85, and 3.5. The corresponding average degrees
are 2.598, 2.809, 3.025, and 3.609, respectively. From the
plots, we can draw the following observations.
O4. Similar to the plots in Fig. 3 under power law degree
distributions, the PoCF tends to decrease with increasing
clustering. This can be also inferred from positive condition
numbers shown in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5. Plots of PoCFs and condition numbers under Poisson degree
distributions. (a) λ = 2.35, (b) λ = 2.6, (c) λ = 2.85 and (d) λ = 3.5.
Fig. 5 plots the PoCF and the condition number for λ =
2.35, 2.6, 2.85, and 3.5. The corresponding average degrees
are 2.598, 2.809, 3.025, and 3.609, espectively. From the
plots, we can draw the following observations.
O4. Similar to the plots in Fig. 3 under power law degree
distributions, the PoCF tends to decrease with increasing
clustering. This can be also inferred from positive condition
numbers shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Plots of PoCFs and condition numbers under Poisson degree
distributions (a) λ = 2.3 , (b) λ = 2.6, (c) λ = 2.85 and (d) λ = 3.5.
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2.35, 2.6, 2.85, and 3.5. The corresponding av age s
are 2.598, 2.809, 3.025, a 3.609, resp ctively. From the
plots, we can draw the following observations.
1111
,
0.6 0.8 1
0.5
1
ratio q2/q1 (6 = 2.35)
,
0.6 0.8 1
0.5
1
ratio q2/q1 (6 = 2.6)
,
0.6 0.8 1
0.5
1
ratio q2/q1 (6 = 2.85)
Fig. 6. Ratios of infection probabilities.
One noticeable difference is that comparing Fig. 5 to
Fig. 3 reveals that the PoCF is much more sensitive and
decreases more rapidly with increasing clustering. This is
a direct consequence of the earlier observations that (i) CS
degrees are concentrated around the mean value under Pois-
son degree distributions and (ii) when CS degrees are more
concentrated around the mean value, the clustering tends
to impede cascading failures and have greater influence
on PoCFs, especially with small mean degrees (which lie
between 2.598 and 3.609 for scenarios shown in Fig. 5).
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Fig. 7. Ratios of PoCFs (1− µ1)/(1− µ2). (a) Poisson degree distribu-
tions for λ = 2.35, 2.6, and 2.85, (b) power law degree distribution for
β = 1.6, 1.85, and 2.1.
O5. Comparing the condition numbers in Figs. 3 and 5
and the infection probability ratios in Figs. 4 and 6, we can
see that both the condition numbers and the infection prob-
ability ratios are considerably larger with Poisson degree
distributions. This tells us that the ratio of PoCFs given by
1−µ1
1−µ2 , which equals the sum of the first two ratios, is larger
than one with Poisson degree distributions. This is shown in
Fig. 7(a). Therefore, it corroborates Remark 2 in the previous
section that, when the degree distribution is concentrated, a
type 1 CS is more effective at triggering cascading failures
than a type 2 CS.
Let E [pt], t ∈ T , be the average degree among type t
CSes. Given that q2 < q1 as shown in Fig. 6, if E [p2] −
E [p1] < 1, clearly a type 1 CS would serve as a better
trigger than a type 2 CS because, together, they imply that a
type 1 CS on the average generates (i) more type 1 children
and (ii) a larger number of immediate children. It turns out
that the difference E [p2]−E [p1] is (considerably) less than
one in the cases we considered. For example, for α = 0.6 and
λ = 2.35 (resp. α = 0.8 and λ = 2.85), we have E [p1] =
2.899 andE [p2] = 3.303 (resp.E [p1] = 3.194 andE [p2] =
3.562).
Carrying out the same exercise for power law degree
distributions illustrates that the ratio of PoCFs
(
1−µ1
1−µ2
)
is
less than one, as shown in Fig. 7(b). Thus, in this case, the
opposite is true, and a type 2 CS is more likely to trigger
a cascade of failures than a type 1 CS. This can be in part
attributed to the following observation:
Substituting the expressions for the power law degree
distributions and the assumed failure probability function
in the expressions for the conditional degree distributions
pt yields
pt(d) ∝ d−(β+α−1) for all t ≤ d ≤ Dmax. (11)
From (11), because the conditional degree distribution does
not decrease quickly (e.g., exponentially) with d, the differ-
enceE [p2]−E [p1] tends to be larger than one. For instance,
for α = 0.8 and β = 1.6 (resp. α = 0.6 and β = 1.85), we
haveE [p1] = 3.846 andE [p2] = 5.941 (resp.E [p1] = 3.668
andE [p2] = 5.785). Therefore, this suggests that, at least for
small clustering coefficient C , a type 2 CS is more likely to
be successful at setting off cascading failures than a type 1
CS because its (expected) degree is much larger.
8 A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For each t ∈ T , define a generating function ft : [0, 1]3 →
[0, 1], where
ft(s1, s2;C) =
∑
(o1,o2)∈Z2+
ht(o1, o2;C) s
o1
1 s
o2
2 . (12)
Then, for a fixed clustering coefficient C ∈ (0, 1), the PoE
vector µ is given as a fixed point that satisfies
f(µ;C) = µ ≤ 1, (13)
where f(s;C) = (f1(s;C), f2(s;C)). When ρ(M) > 1, there
exists a unique µ that satisfies (13) with strict inequality, i.e.,
µ < 1 [20].
In order to prove the theorem, we will first prove that, if
(1−µ11)q1 ≥ (1−µ12)q2 (resp. (1−µ11)q1 ≥ (1−µ12)q2), then
µ1 ≤ f(µ1;C2) (resp. µ1 ≥ f(µ1;C2)). When this is true,
Corollary 2 [20, p. 42] tells us that µ1 ≤ µ2 (resp. µ1 ≥ µ2),
completing the proof.
Let us begin with the first part of the theorem. Recall
from (8) and (12)
f1(s;C) =
∑
o∈Z2+
h1(o;C) s
o1
1 s
o2
2
=
∑
o∈Z2+
so11 s
o2
2
∑
d≥o1+o2+1
(
p1(d)
[
d− 1
o1 : o2
]
×(vC1,1)o1 (vC1,2)o2 (vC1,0)d−o1−o2−1
)
.
After exchanging the order of the two summations, we
obtain
f1(s;C)
=
∑
d∈IN
p1(d)
( ∑
o∈Z2+:o1+o2≤d−1
so11 s
o2
2
[
d− 1
o1 : o2
]
×(vC1,1)o1 (vC1,2)o2 (vC1,0)d−o1−o2−1
)
=
∑
d∈IN
p1(d)
(
s1 v
C
1,1 + s2 v
C
1,2 + v
C
1,0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: ψ1(s, C)
)d−1
. (14)
i . . ti f i f ti r iliti .
4. Similar to the plots in Fig. 3 under power law degree
distributions, the PoCF tends to decrease with increasing
clustering. This can be also inferred from positive condition
numbers shown in Fig. 5.
One noticeable difference is that comparing Fig. 5 to
Fig. 3 reveals that the PoCF is much more sensitive and
decreases more rapidly with increasing clustering. This is
a direct consequence of the earlier observations that (i) CS
degrees are concentrated around the mean value under Pois-
son degree distributions and (ii) when CS degrees are more
concentrated around the mean value, the clustering tends
to impede cascading failures and have greater influence
on PoCFs, especially with small mean degrees (which lie
between 2.598 and 3.609 for scenarios shown in Fig. 5).
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β = 1.6, 1.85, and 2.1.
O5. Comparing the condition numbers in Figs. 3 and 5
and the infection probability ratios in Figs. 4 and 6, we can
see that both the condition numbers and the infection prob-
ability ratios are considerably larger with Poisson degree
distributions. This tells us that the ratio of PoCFs given by
1−µ1
1−µ2 , which equals the sum of the first two ratios, is larger
than one with Poisson degree distributions. This is shown in
Fig. 7(a). Therefore, it corroborates Remark 2 in the previous
section that, when the degree distribution is concentrated, a
type 1 CS is more effective at triggering cascading failures
than a type 2 CS.
Let E [pt], t ∈ T , be the average degree among type t
CSes. Given that q2 < q1 as shown in Fig. 6, if E [p2] −
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Fig. 7. Ratios of PoCFs (1− µ1)/(1− µ2). (a) Poisson degree distribu-
tions for λ = 2.35, 2.6, and 2.85, (b) power law degree distribution for
β = 1.6, 1.85, and 2.1.
O5. Comparing the condition numbers in Figs. 3 and 5
and the infection probability ratios in Figs. 4 and 6, we can
see that both the condition numbers and the infection prob-
ability ratios are considerably larger with Poisson degree
distributions. This tells us that the ratio of PoCFs given by
1−µ1
1−µ2 , which equals the sum of the first two ratios, is larger
than one with Poisson degree distributions. This is shown in
Fig. 7(a). Therefore, it corroborates Remark 2 in the previous
section that, when the degree distribution is concentrated, a
type 1 CS is more effective at triggering cascading failures
than a type 2 CS.
Let E [pt], t ∈ T , be the average degree among type t
CSes. Given that q2 < q1 as shown in Fig. 6, if E [p2] −
E [p1] < 1, clearly a type 1 CS would serve as a better
trigger than a type 2 CS because, together, they imply that a
type 1 CS on the average generates (i) more type 1 children
and (ii) a larger number of immediate children. It turns out
that the difference E [p2]−E [p1] is (c nsiderably) less than
one in the cases we con idered. For example, for α = 0.6 and
λ = 2.35 (resp. α = 0.8 and λ = 2.85), we have E [p1] =
2.899 andE [p2] = 3.303 (resp.E [p1] = 3.194 andE [p2] =
3.562).
Carrying out the same exercise for power law degree
distributions illustrates that the ratio of PoCFs
(
1
1−µ2
)
is
less than e, as shown in Fig. 7(b). Thus, in this case, the
opposite is true, and a type 2 CS is more likely o trigger
a cascade of failures than a type 1 CS. This can be in part
attributed to the following observation:
Substituting the expressions for the power law degree
distributions and the assumed failure probability function
in the expressions for the conditional degree distributions
pt yields
pt(d) ∝ d−(β+α−1) for all t ≤ d ≤ Dmax. (11)
From (11), because the conditional degree distribution does
not decrease quickly (e.g., exponentially) with d, the differ-
ence [ 2]−E [p1] te s to be larger than one. For instance,
for α = 0.8 and β = 1.6 (resp. α = 0.6 and β = 1.85), we
haveE [p1] = 3.846 andE [p2] = 5.941 (resp.E [p1] = 3.668
andE [p2] = 5.785). Therefore, th s suggests that, at least for
small cl st ring coefficient C , a type 2 CS is more likely to
be successful at setting off cascading failures than a type 1
CS because its (expected) degree is much larger.
8 A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For each t ∈ T , define a generating function ft : [0, 1]3 →
[0, 1], where
ft(s1, s2;C) =
∑
(o1,o2)∈Z2+
ht(o1, o2;C) s
o1
1 s
o2
2 . (12)
Then, for a fixed clustering coefficient C ∈ (0, 1), the PoE
vector µ is given as a fixed point that satisfies
f(µ;C) = µ ≤ 1, (13)
where f(s;C) = (f1(s;C), f2(s;C)). When ρ(M) > 1, there
exists a unique µ that satisfies (13) with strict inequality, i.e.,
µ < 1 [20].
In order to prove the theorem, we will first prove that, if
(1−µ11)q1 ≥ (1−µ12)q2 (resp. (1−µ1)q1 ≥ (1−µ12)q2), then
µ1 ≤ f(µ1;C2) (resp. µ1 ≥ f(µ1;C2)). When this is true,
Corollary 2 [20, p. 42] tells us that µ1 ≤ µ2 (resp. µ1 ≥ µ2),
compl ting the proof.
Let us begin with the first part of the theorem. Recall
from (8) and (12)
f1(s;C) =
∑
o∈Z2+
h1(o;C) s
o1
1 s
o2
2
=
∑
o∈Z2+
so11 s
o2
2
∑
d≥o1+o2+1
(
p1(d)
[
d 1
o1 : o2
]
×(vC1,1) 1 (vC1,2)o2 (vC1,0)d−o1−o2−1
)
.
12
After exchanging the order of the two summations, we
obtain
f1(s;C)
=
∑
d∈IN
p1(d)
( ∑
o∈Z2+:o1+o2≤d−1
so11 s
o2
2
[
d− 1
o1 : o2
]
×(vC1,1)o1 (vC1,2)o2 (vC1,0)d−o1−o2−1
)
=
∑
d∈IN
p1(d)
(
s1 v
C
1,1 + s2 v
C
1,2 + v
C
1,0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: ψ1(s, C)
)d−1
. (14)
The second equality in (14) follows from the well-known
equality
∑
∑m
k=1 nk=N
(
N
n1, n2, . . . , nm
) m∏
k=1
(xk)
nk =
(
m∑
k=1
xk
)N
,
where the summation on the left-hand side is over non-
negative integers nk, k = 1, 2, . . . ,m, whose sum equals
N . Following similar steps, we obtain
f2(s;C) =
∑
o∈Z2+
h2(o;C) s
o1
1 s
o2
2
=
∑
o∈Z2+
so11 s
o2
2
∑
d≥o1+o2+2
(
p2(d)
[
d− 2
o1 : o2
]
×(vC2,1)o1 (vC2,2)o2 (vC2,0)d−o1−o2−2
)
=
∞∑
d=2
p2(d)
( ∑
o∈Z2+:o1+o2≤d−2
so11 s
o2
2
[
d− 2
o1 : o2
]
×(vC2,1)o1 (vC2,2)o2 (vC2,0)d−o1−o2−2
)
=
∞∑
d=2
p2(d)
(
s1 v
C
2,1 + s2 v
C
2,2 + v
C
2,0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: ψ2(s, C)
)d−2
. (15)
It is clear from (14) that f1(µ1;C1) = µ11 ≤ f1(µ1;C2)
if and only if ψ1(µ1, C1) ≤ ψ1(µ1, C2). Substituting the
expressions vC1,1 = (1 − C)q1, vC1,2 = C · q2 and vC1,0 =
1− vC1,1 − vC1,2 from Section 5.2, we obtain
ψ1(s, C) = s1(1− C)q1 + s2Cq2 + 1− (1− C)q1 − Cq2.
Hence, after grouping only the terms containing C , we see
that ψ(µ1, C1) ≤ ψ(µ1, C2) if and only if
(1− µ11)q1 − (1− µ12)q2 ≥ 0. (16)
We now proceed to demonstrate that µ12 = f2(µ
1;C1) ≤
f2(µ
1;C2). From (15), it is obvious that this claim is true
if and only if ψ2(µ1, C1) ≤ ψ2(µ1, C2). Recall vC2,1 = (1 −
C)2q1, vC2,2 = C(2−C)q2 and vC2,0 = 1− (1−C)2q1−C(2−
C)q2. Plugging in these expressions in ψ2(s;C),
ψ2(s, C) = s1(1− C)2q1 + s2C(2− C)q2
+1− (1− C)2q1 − C(2− C)q2
= 1− (1− C)2q1(1− s1)− C(2− C)q2(1− s2).
Collecting only the terms with C in ψ2(s, C), we get
C(2− C)((1− s1)q1 − (1− s2)q2).
Because C(2 − C) is strictly increasing over (0, 1),
ψ2(µ
1;C1) ≤ ψ2(µ1;C2) if and only if
(1− µ11)q1 − (1− µ12)q2 ≥ 0, (17)
which is the same condition in (16) we obtained earlier. This
completes the proof of the first part of the theorem.
The second part of the theorem is a simple consequence
of the observation that, from the proof of the first part,
ψt(µ
1, C1) ≥ ψt(µ1, C2), t ∈ T , if and only if the inequali-
ties in (16) and (17) go the other way.
9 CONCLUSION
We examined the influence of clustering in interdependent
systems on the likelihood of a random failure setting off
a cascade of failures in a large system. We proposed a
new model that captures the manner in which the triangles
alter how a failure propagates from a failed system to
neighboring systems. Utilizing the model, we derived a
simple condition that indicates how increasing clustering
changes the likelihood of experiencing cascading failures in
large systems. This condition also hints that, as the degree
distribution of the dependence graph becomes more concen-
trated, higher clustering will help curb the onset of widely
spread failures by containing them to a small neighborhood
around an initial failure.
Our model assumes that the underlying dependence
graph is neutral and exhibits no degree correlations. While
this helps us isolate the impact of clustering on the ro-
bustness of the system, some real systems may display
assortative/disassortative mixing. We are currently working
on generalizing the model to incorporate assortativity, while
retaining the separation of the influence of clustering from
that of assortativity. In addition, we are in the process of
extending the model to multiplex/multi-layer networks, in
order to investigate the effects of clustering when nodes are
connected via different types of networks.
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